The United States and Iran are once again on the brink, with a calibrated military build‑up and fragile back‑channel diplomacy unfolding in parallel. In a wide‑ranging conversation on Hindustan Times’ Point Blank, Executive Editor Shishir Gupta and Senior Anchor Aayesha Varma unpack how close the region is to a potential strike, why this moment is uniquely dangerous, and where India fits into the rapidly shifting equation.
A 10‑Day Window – Or 24 Hours?
US President Donald Trump has publicly declared that the world will know within 10 days whether Washington reaches a deal with Tehran or “takes things further” – a deliberately ambiguous formulation that keeps both diplomacy and force on the table. Gupta argues that this timeline is not just rhetorical; it aligns with a concrete military window as the US Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, sails from the Mediterranean towards the Red Sea, North Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden.
By the end of the month, the Ford will be positioned alongside the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, Los Angeles‑class submarines armed with Tomahawk missiles, jamming platforms and layered anti‑ballistic missile defences. In Gupta’s assessment, this concentration of firepower is comparable to the US build‑up ahead of the 2003 Iraq invasion, creating a moment when Washington can genuinely choose between a diplomatic settlement and a limited but devastating strike. Trump may have spoken of 10 days, Gupta notes, but nothing prevents action within 24 hours should he decide that Iran is crossing a red line on its nuclear ambitions.
A Region on Edge
While Washington talks timelines and options, the region is already behaving as if conflict could break out any day. Gupta reveals that Israeli national security specialists are preparing in very tangible ways – from cleaning and stocking bomb shelters to maintaining a general state of alert. Similar alerts, he says, are visible in Iran and across parts of the Middle East as governments and populations brace for potential escalation layered atop ongoing crises in Gaza and Houthi‑driven instability.
This accumulation of flashpoints, combined with an American armada offshore and Iran’s contested nuclear and missile programmes, creates what Gupta calls an “unstable” and “dangerous” environment that can “explode at any point of time.” Neither Tehran nor Washington, he believes, seems particularly inclined to listen to external counsel, further amplifying the risk that miscalculation or domestic political pressure could tilt the balance toward confrontation.
Talks in Ambiguity: Washington, Tehran and Domestic Audiences
Yet even as carriers move and submarines deploy, diplomacy is not dead. Gupta points to indirect talks involving US envoys like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, as evidence that both sides still seek a negotiated outcome, at least as a first resort. The very fact that Iran has sent a senior representative signals that Tehran wants to explore a diplomatic solution before the situation spirals.
However, Gupta stresses that US‑Iran engagements are historically shaped by clashing political cultures and domestic compulsions. American officials, he says, tend to speak “straight and blunt,” while Iranian negotiators, drawing on a civilizational tradition, prefer “ambiguity” and modulation – a style that can easily breed confusion and mistrust. Domestically, Iran must project defiance, continuing the narrative it has cultivated since the 1979 Islamic Revolution that it stands up to US pressure. Washington, for its part, must reassure its public and allies that it will not allow Iran to achieve nuclear‑weapon capability or field ballistic missiles capable of reaching Europe – a threshold Gupta describes as “very, very serious.”
Iran’s Weakness – And Its Proxies
Militarily, Gupta believes Iran is highly vulnerable at this moment. He contends that Iran’s air defences have been severely degraded by previous US and Israeli actions, leaving Tehran with “hardly any air defense left” to stop incoming American or Israeli missiles. In such a scenario, Iran’s primary option would be to absorb strikes and retaliate with what it has: ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones, weapons it has already used in previous confrontations.
Complicating the picture further is Iran’s network of proxies across the Middle East – from Hamas and Hezbollah to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Kataib Hezbollah and other Shia‑Sunni militant outfits supplied and supported by Tehran, with Israel, the US and American bases as primary targets. Gupta argues that many of these groups have been “emasculated” by Israeli operations, with Hamas “decimated” in Gaza and Hezbollah weakened, making this a moment when proxies are less capable of mounting a decisive counter‑response. For hawks in Washington, that combination – a weakened Iranian air defence and weakened proxies – makes this “the best time to go into Iran” if a military option is chosen.
Sunni Powers: Public Distance, Private Relief
Gupta underlines that key Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar are unlikely to openly endorse or facilitate a US strike on Iran. Publicly, they are expected to deny American use of their air bases for offensive operations, forcing Washington to lean on facilities in Jordan and Qatar instead. Yet beneath the public posture, he suggests, these states may quietly welcome a decisive check on Iran’s regional ambitions, nuclear aspirations and ballistic missile arsenal, given how much of the unrest on their streets they attribute to Tehran‑inspired radicalisation.
Interestingly, Gupta notes that Iran’s own ballistic missile development carries inherent risks even for Tehran’s allies, as some of these missiles may not reach intended targets and could explode prematurely at shorter ranges, adding another layer of chaos to any escalatory cycle.
India’s Balancing Act
In the midst of this churn, India’s approach is deliberate and cautious. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit Israel for a day and hold talks with his “friend” Benjamin Netanyahu, a visit that naturally raises questions about New Delhi’s role as tensions spike. Gupta is categorical that India’s stance is “clear‑cut” rather than ambiguous: New Delhi will stay out of the conflict militarily and avoid taking sides.
India has long‑standing civilizational ties with Iran, deep strategic and defence cooperation with Israel, and a comprehensive partnership with the United States. Given these overlapping relationships, Gupta says, India will push for “restraint and peace” and favour diplomatic pathways over any endorsement of military action, while protecting its own interests and citizens in the wider region.
Limited Strikes, Regime Survival and the Iraq Lesson
Could Iran survive a conflict if it does break out? Gupta’s answer is nuanced and conditional. In the scenario of a limited US strike focused on nuclear facilities and ballistic missile assets, Washington could significantly set back Iran’s nuclear programme by as much as a decade, without necessarily toppling the regime outright. However, an all‑out offensive would raise the question of regime change, and here Gupta is sceptical about the current Iranian leadership’s ability to survive given widespread protests, thousands reportedly killed on the streets, and the regime’s eroding legitimacy.
At the same time, he invokes the Iraq precedent: the removal of Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum that fuelled the rise of ISIS, underscoring how little control external powers ultimately have once a regime collapses. Without clarity on “the next steps” and who would govern post‑conflict Iran, he warns, an attempt at regime change could unleash unpredictable and potentially more dangerous forces across the region.
For now, Gupta expects any US action, if ordered, to focus on “specific pinpointed attacks” on nuclear sites and missile capabilities rather than a full‑scale war. He also dismisses the prospect of an all‑out nuclear exchange, arguing that any confrontation will more likely involve ballistic missiles, drones and precision strikes rather than nuclear weapons.
Russia, China and the Limits of Signalling
Even Russia and China, often seen as Iran’s geopolitical backers, are unlikely to decisively alter the military balance in this immediate crisis, Gupta suggests. Their ships in the Gulf of Aden are primarily deployed as part of anti‑piracy escort forces, and while planned joint naval drills with Iran send a political signal, they do not meaningfully counter the scale of the American armada already in theatre. He does not foresee a “battle on the high seas” between great powers; instead, any confrontation will be dominated by missiles, drones and stand‑off capabilities.
Ultimately, Gupta frames the moment as one of compressed choices. If Washington intends to use military force to halt Iran’s nuclear and missile trajectory and degrade its proxies, he believes there “could not be a better time” than the present configuration of US power and Iranian vulnerability. If it chooses not to act, Iran will likely continue enriching uranium, expanding its ballistic missile reach and re‑arming its networks – ensuring that the question of war and peace in the Gulf is deferred, not resolved.