AMERICA’S HUNGER for Greenland is setting off an explosive row within NATO. President Donald Trump, infuriated by European allies’ resistance to his effort to annex the autonomous Danish territory, said on January 17th that he would impose 10% tariffs on imports from eight European countries that had sent troops there two days earlier. European leaders vowed not to be bullied.
In a rambling social-media post, Mr Trump accused allies of causing “a very dangerous situation for the Safety, Security, and Survival of our Planet”. He said the 10% impost would rise to 25% in June and continue “until such time as a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland”.
Talks between American and Danish officials last week produced no deal. As thousands of Greenlanders and Danes took to the streets to say the territory was “not for sale”, European leaders responded angrily to the tariff threat. “No intimidation nor threat will influence us, neither in Ukraine, nor in Greenland,” said Emmanuel Macron, the French president. Ulf Kristersson, Sweden’s prime minister, offered a similarly defiant message: “We will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed.” Britain’s prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, called the threat of American tariffs “completely wrong”. EU leaders promised they would consult and respond.
The stakes for NATO are enormous. “If the United States decides to militarily attack another NATO country, then everything would stop,” argued Mette Frederiksen, Denmark’s prime minister on January 5th. “That includes NATO and therefore post-second-world-war security.”
Rows among NATO members are not unknown. From the 1950s to the 1970s Britain and Iceland waged the so-called cod wars, with Icelandic ships opening fire in 1975. More importantly, Turkey invaded Cyprus the previous year, bringing it into direct conflict with Greek-Cypriot and some Greek troops. Greece responded by pulling out of NATO’s integrated military command for six years. In 1996 a Greek fighter jet shot down a Turkish warplane over the Aegean sea. And in 2020 a Turkish warship locked its fire-control radar onto a French frigate in the Mediterranean, amid tensions over Libya’s civil war.
Those skirmishes had little long-term impact. American threats to Greenland are far more serious because America remains the political and military backbone of NATO. An American general serves, as one has done for 75 years, as the supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR). NATO defence plans for Europe—including Greenland—were written by the last SACEUR, Chris Cavoli, and assume a high degree of American involvement. American military officers sit atop and are woven throughout every major command. And without American air power and intelligence, NATO forces would find it much harder and costlier to defeat Russian aggression.
If America were to absorb Greenland, whether by legal fait accompli or force, the resulting crisis would collapse European trust in Article 5, the alliance’s mutual-defence clause. Mr Trump has frequently cast doubt on it. European faith now hangs by a thread. If he were willing to dismember one European country, why would he come to the aid of another being dismembered by Russia?
Even if there are no battles on the streets of Nuuk, the shock of a near-bloodless Anschluss would be a moment of profound and irreversible disillusionment. “How does NATO continue its critical work on Russia,” asks Julie Smith, who served as Joe Biden’s envoy to NATO, “in light of its most powerful member infringing on the territorial sovereignty of another member?”
European governments would then face a stark choice. Some would argue that Greenland is too small and unimportant to warrant collapsing transatlantic ties; others would be concerned that a rupture could prompt Russia to attack (or at least probe) European defences.
Another option would be to push back. Europeans could, for instance, resort to economic punishment through sanctions and tariffs. The European Union has held back from heavy retaliation to Mr Trump’s tariffs in part because of its dependence on American military power. But Mr Trump’s threat may change that calculus. After his post, senior members of the European Parliament suggested the trade deal struck last year between America and the EU last August would not survive. Europe could also take a more aggressive economic approach, targeting American tech companies. But that would have to be done at the same time as emergency rises in defence spending. A fresh trade war would put huge pressure on budgets.
A major issue would be the future of American forces and bases on the continent. Many European states would want these to stay, regardless of any Arctic escapades, as a security blanket. Others might see a threat to get rid of them as leverage with the Americans. It would be extremely hard for America to project military power into Africa and the Middle East without access to European bases such as Ramstein, a sprawling hub in Germany. America’s seizure of a Venezuelan-linked oil tanker on January 7th depended on access to British airfields and bases, for instance, as well as unspecified support from Denmark. Indeed, America’s ability to monitor and counter threats in the Arctic—ostensibly what drives its pursuit of Greenland—depends on co-operation from Greenland, Iceland, Britain and Norway, among other NATO allies.
In a sudden rupture, Britain could face a crisis in its signals-intelligence apparatus, its nuclear deterrent and its future submarine force. Many European air forces would not be able to fully operate the F-35, their most advanced warplane, without access to American communications, targeting data and munitions. That could force them to take a more restrained approach.
European leaders could find themselves caught between public anger—62% of Germans expressed support for coming to Denmark’s aid in a conflict with America—and the reality of dependence. NATO is too complex to dissolve in a day. “The impact on the alliance would not be immediate,” argues Ms Smith. “I would not expect a grand announcement that the alliance was officially closing its doors. There is a world in which the alliance would continue to hum along, but without the underlying trust that has sat at the foundation of NATO since its creation some 75 years ago.”